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Quantum information has been a majorly productive research program over
the last two decades. It has enabled scientists to make progress theoretically,
experimentally, and in terms of the development of technology. However, our
understanding of what quantum information is telling us about the world—
and what it is telling us about quantum theory itself—remains underdevel-
oped. Broadly speaking, this paper is an attempt to reconcile the conceptual
framework at play in the metaphysical approach to the foundations of quan-
tum mechanics with the framework at play in quantum information science.
In this paper, I focus on a debate about the predicted behavior of quantum
systems in the presence of a localized region of spacetime subject to nonlinear
laws of evolution. The particular example under consideration is that of a
closed timelike curve, or CTC. In this literature, the peculiarities of how time
travel could possibly be achieved is not addressed. Rather, CTCs are treated
as a resource. In this context, we can formulate the question “what could we
do if we had access to a CTC?”
David Deutsch’s seminal 1991 paper (Deutsch 1991) set the groundwork
for a quantum mechanical analysis of the information-processing capabilities
of a quantum system augmented by access to a CTC. Over the last decade,
interest has flourished in the particular computational tasks that can be
achieved with a CTC-assisted quantum computer circuit. However, a debate
has arisen surrounding a particularly strange result: the ability to distinguish
non-orthogonal quantum states. This is not allowed in ordinary quantum
theory, but the Deutsch’s analysis of the behavior of quantum systems in the
presence of a CTC seems to predict it.1 Furthermore, this ability leads to
1In this paper, I will be working exclusively with Deutsch’s CTC model for quantum
1
an even more radical conclusion: quantum CTCs allow for information to be
sent between arbitrarily distant parties instantaneously.
However, there has been serious resistance to this conclusion from vari-
ous parties to the debate. And the attempts to formulate exactly why this
admittedly non-quantum-mechanical behavior should be ruled out has been
illuminating of the underlying assumptions that are often at play, even in a
field such as quantum information, which purports to be formulated entirely
in operationalist terms, and neutral with respect to interpretational debates.
A CTC-assisted quantum computational circuit may seem like an exotic
example. But analyzing these kinds of systems has proved to be very fruitful.
Working with this example has brought to light several common confusions
about one of the central concepts of quantum theory: nonlocality. In the
foundations literature, quantum nonlocality is often closely connected to the
concepts of information and causation. For example, it is often said that the
nonlocal correlations quantum mechanics are allowed at spacelike separation
because no information is traveling between the two distant systems A and
B faster than a light signal could. In cases where nonlocality is exploited
as an information channel (as in the quantum teleportation protocol) then
quantum information is not present (or useable) at B until after a classical
(lightlike) signal is received from A.
I will argue that the exploitation of quantum correlations to send a
message—as allowed by the existence of CTCs—should be distinguished from
cases where a carrier of information is physically traversing the space between
two distant points faster than the speed of light. These two notions are of-
ten conflated. A consequence of this argument is that relativity prohibits
only the latter, and doesnt rule out the possibility of (what I term) Nonlocal
Signaling.
This is contrary to a foundational principle of the quantum information-
theoretic approach. The No-Signaling Principle plays a fundamental role in
the formulation of quantum information. I argue that this accounts for the
resistance to the conclusion that it can be violated under certain conditions.
Furthermore, I argue that the No-Signaling Principle’s inclusion as a fun-
systems (D-CTCs). There is an alternative proposal for how to understand the behavior
of quantum systems in the presence of CTCs, referred to as P-CTCs. While there are
significant differences between the predictions and underlying physics of the two proposals,
both allow for the behavior under consideration in this paper, i.e. distinguishing non-
orthogonal states, and Nonlocal Signaling. In fact, Gisin showed (Gisin 1990) that a more
general nonlinear framework would allow for the same behavior.
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damental postulate about the nature of the quantum world, as is the case
in the quantum information-theoretic interpretation of quantum theory, as
advocated in Bub and Pitowsky’s “Two Dogmas About Quantum Mechan-
ics”, represents a commitment to a principle-theoretic conception of quantum
theory.
Whereas a “constructive” theory is built up from its ontology and dy-
namics, the fundamental formulation of “principle” theory is “top-down”, in
terms of inviolable global principles (the paradigm case is special relativity).
Principle theories explicitly deny the fundamentality of a theory’s ontology,
and consider constructive formulations of theories to be secondary, and to
have a role only as proofs of the consistency of their principles. I suggest that
the framework developed by Deutsch is inconsistent with these commitments,
and therefore the justification for including the No-Signaling Principle in the
D-CTC framework offered by quantum information theorists is indefensible.
This paper will examine the recent debate surrounding this point in the
foundations literature. I will address each argument for the impossibility of
Nonlocal Signaling. I will argue that each of these arguments falls short of
its goal either for technical reasons, or for reasons of insufficient justification
for imposing global constraints on the possible correlations allowed in this
context.
I will argue that there is a deeper motivation at play for rule out the
possibility of Nonlocal Signaling, which has to do with the fundamental com-
mitments of the quantum information approach. I argue, however, that the
framework developed by Deutsch is inconsistent with these commitments,
and therefore the justification for including a No Signaling principle in the
D-CTC framework offered by quantum information theorists is indefensible.
2 Deutsch’s Circuit Model for CTCs
In his well known (1991) paper, Deutsch introduced a model for the analysis
of the physical behavior of CTCs. Prior to his work, the standard way of
analyzing the physical effects of chronology-violating regions of spacetime
was in terms of their underlying geometry. Deutsch considered this approach
to be insufficient because it fails to take quantum mechanical effects into
account. He proposed an alternative approach which involves analyzing the
behavior of CTCs in terms of their information processing capabilities.
He begins his account by defining a notion of equivalence between spacetime-
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bounded networks containing chronology-violating regions. A network in this
context is to be understood as a spacetime geometry which takes as input the
initial state of a physical system and outputs the system’s final state. Two
networks are denotationally equivalent if their outputs are the same function
of their inputs. That is to say, regardless of whether two networks have dif-
fering spacetime geometries if the function that maps their initial states to
their final states is the same, they are denotationally equivalent.
Next he introduces the idea that the transformation between any two
denotationally equivalent networks is trivial. Insofar as we are interested
in analyzing CTCs in terms of their physical effects (that is, their output
given a certain input), we are free to use the simplest model available in the
denotational equivalence class of a particular network for the purpose of our
analysis of the information flow through a CTC.
The final step of his proposal is to introduce a simple standard form
into which any spacetime-bounded network can be trivially transformed for
the purpose of analysis. The simple standard form involves translating all
spacetime-bounded networks into circuits in which each particle traveling in
the original network is replaced by sufficiently many carrier particles, each of
which have a single 2-state internal degree of freedom (a bit). The regions in
which the particles interact are localized (by denotationally trivial transfor-
mations) into gates, such that the particles are inert while traveling between
them. And finally, all chronology-violating effects of the network are local-
ized to sufficiently many carrier particles on closed loops, which only interact
with chronology-respecting particles in gates.
Deutsch points out that chronology violation itself makes no difference
to the behavior of a network unless there is a closed loop of information. In
the original network, this closed information path could potentially not be
confined to the trajectory of any single particle (since the carriers can interact
with each other), but for any such network, there is a denotationally trivial
transformation which will localize the closed information path on sufficiently
many carriers on closed paths.
The real innovation of this approach is that it can very easily accommo-
date quantum mechanical effects by relaxing the requirement that the carrier
particles be in a well-defined classical state after interactions. If viewed clas-
sically, networks containing chronology violations can lead to paradoxes that
seem to put unnaturally strong constraints on possible initial conditions of
physical systems (e.g. you are somehow prohibited from getting in the time
machine that would take you back to kill your grandfather). Deutsch uses
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his model to argue that, when quantum mechanics is taken into account,
these unnatural constraints on initial states disappear. Deutsch’s fixed point
theorem states that CTCs “place no retrospective constraints on the state of
a quantum system” (Deutsch 1991, 3203). That is to say, for any possible
input state, there will be a paradox-free solution.
This is the result of a consistency condition implied by the quantum
mechanical treatment of time-traveling carrier particles interacting with later
versions of themselves. If we let |ψ〉 be the initial state of the “younger”
version of the carrier particle, and let ρˆ be the density operator of the “older”
version of the carrier particle, then joint density operator of the two particles
entering the region of interaction is
|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ ρˆ
and the density operator of the two carrier particles after the interaction is
U(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ ρˆ)U †
where U is the interaction unitary. The consistency condition requires that
the density operator of the younger version of the carrier particle as it leaves
the region of interaction is the same as that of the older version as it enters
the region of interaction.
ρˆ = Tr[U(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ ρˆ)U †]
This makes intuitive sense, because it is the interaction that causes the ear-
lier version of the carrier particle to become the later version. When trans-
lated via a denotationally trivial transformation to a network in which the
chronology-violating behavior is localized to a single particle on a CTC, and it
interacts with a chronology-respecting (CR) carrier particle, the consistency
condition for the CTC system is
ρCTC = Trsys[U(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ ρCTC)U †].
This requirement says that the density operator of the system on the CTC
after the interaction is the same as it was before the interaction. That is to
say, after the interaction, the carrier particle on the CTC enters the “future
mouth” of the wormhole, and exits the “past mouth” of the wormhole before
the interaction. The state of the particle that comes out of the past mouth
must be the same as the system that enters the future mouth. Furthermore,
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ρCTC depends on |ψ〉, so the input state on the causality-respecting carrier
particle has an effect on the state of the particle it will interact with.
In light of this dependence, Deutsch’s claim that CTCs, when properly
understood, place no constraints on the possible states of the quantum system
may be stronger than is warranted. While it is true that, unlike the classical
analysis of time travel paradoxes, his model places no constraints on the
input state of the causality-respecting system, it does constrain the possible
states of the system confined to the CTC.
While this seems more intuitively plausible than the classical time travel
paradoxes, it is nonetheless puzzling. In the classical case, it is somehow
forbidden that I get in the time machine that will take me back to kill my
grandfather. There isn’t necessarily any obvious causal mechanism that pre-
vents me. It is simply impossible, to avoid paradox, that I ever actually
carry out my mission. This constraint is often described as superdeterminis-
tic, since it is something above and beyond simple determinism that rules out
the possibility of me getting into the time machine. David Lewis’s influential
formulation of the classical consistency condition from his (1976) alleviates
some of this tension by redescribing the time travel narrative as a single,
self-consistent history. The drawback of this approach is that it seriously
undermines the notion that the time traveler has free will.
In Deutsch’s model, this tension is seemingly resolved. Any initial state of
the system is allowed—the time traveler could enter the time machine with
any intentions whatsoever. Consistency is guaranteed by the state of the
system confined to the CTC. This doesn’t offend the intuitions as badly as
the classical case, because we can imagine the following pseudotime narrative:
The causality-respecting qubit begins its journey in some initial state, then
encounters and interacts with CTC quibit, precipitating a change of state of
both of them. The CTC qubit in its new state then travels back in time to
again interact with the causality-respecting qubit (in its initial state), and the
interaction again changes the state of the CTC qubit. Over infinite iterations
of this process, the CTC qubit converges on some particular state, like a top
that’s rotation stabilizes after some initial wobbling. The CR qubit causes
the CTC qubit to be in the right state.
The puzzle arises, though, when we note that the CTC qubit must always
have been in this stable state. There are no previous interactions with the
CR qubit to force it to evolve over time into the right state. So although
Deutsch’s model has avoided the superdeterminism of the traditional time
travel paradoxes, which constrained the initial states of the CR system, it
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seems to have introduced significant kinematic constraints in another place.
Something like Lewis’s classical consistency condition must still be at play.
That is to say, there must be a deeper metaphysical justification (i.e. the im-
possibility of a self-contradictory history) which is behind Deutcsh’s quantum
condition. And as we’ll see in Section 5.2, Deutsch seemingly has something
like this in mind.
Deutsch’s analysis of the physical effects of chronology-violating regions
of spacetime in terms of quantum computational circuits and the consistency
condition has been very influential in the study of quantum information, and
has led to many interesting insights about the nature of the quantum world.
One particularly interesting result is due to Brun, Harrington and Wilde. In
what follows, I will discuss their work, the debate surrounding their central
claim, and further implications of their argument.
3 The BHW Circuit
In (Brun et al. 2009), the authors described a procedure for using CTC-
assisted quantum computational circuits to distinguish between non-orthogonal
states of a qubit. In this section, I will describe the protocol for distinguish-




3.1 Details of the BHW Circuit
The authors begin by detailing a protocol for distinguishing between two non-
orthogonal states. The setup involves two qubits: system A in the unknown
initial state |ψ〉 (either |0〉 or |−〉), and system B, a qubit in some state
|φ〉 on a CTC. The procedure is simple: (1) perform a SWAP of systems A
and B, (2) perform a controlled-Hadamard transformation with system A as
the control and system B as the target, and (3) measure system A in the
computational basis. A measurement of system A that yields the output |0〉
means that the input state |ψ〉 = |0〉. A measurement of system A that yields
the output |1〉 means that the input state |ψ〉 = |−〉.
This result obtains because of Deutsch’s consistency condition. Whatever
state system B is in when it enters the future mouth of the wormhole must
be the same state that comes out of the past mouth of the wormhole. That
is, steps (1) and (2) must have no net effect on system B. The density matrix
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of the system on the CTC (system B) depends on the input state of system
A:
ρCTC = Trsys[U(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ ρCTC)U †]
and the output of the circuit (i.e. the final state of the CR quibit) depends
on the input of system A and ρCTC:
ρoutput = TrCTC[U(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ ρCTC)U †].
Since the only two possible input states are |ψ〉 = |0〉 and |ψ〉 = |−〉, the
consistency condition requires that the only possible initial states of system
B are |φ〉 = |0〉 and |φ〉 = |1〉.
Figure 1: BHW circuit for distinguishing between |ψ〉 = |0〉 and |ψ〉 = |−〉 (from Brun
et al. 2009).
Consider the situation where the input state of system A is |ψ〉 = |0〉.
If the initial state of system B is |φ〉 = |1〉, then the effect of the first
gate (SWAP) would be to transform system A into the state state |1〉 and
system B into the state |0〉. Since system A is in the state |1〉, the action of
the second gate (controlled-Hadamard with A as the control and B as the
target) would transform system B into the state |+〉. Since the consistency
condition requires that the state of B after the action of the two gates is the
same as the state of B before the action of the two gates, it is clear that
|φ〉 = |1〉 is not an allowed initial state of system B when |ψ〉 = |0〉.
However, if the initial state of system B were |φ〉 = |0〉, then after the
action of the first gate (SWAP), system A would be in state |0〉 and system B
would be in state |0〉. The second gate (controlled-Hadamard) would not be
activated since the control qubit is in state |0〉, so the consistency condition
for system B holds. The measurement of system A would yield a result of
|0〉, which indicates that the initial input state was |ψ〉 = |0〉.
Now consider the case where system A is initially in the state |ψ〉 = |−〉.
If the initial state of system B is |φ〉 = |0〉, then after the action of the first
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gate (SWAP), system A would be in the state |0〉 and system B would be in
the state |−〉. Since A is the control qubit for the second gate (controlled-
Hadamard), it would not be activated and system B would pass through
unchanged. It would therefore enter the future mouth of the wormhole in
the state |−〉, violating the consistency condition.
However, if system B had initially been in the state |1〉, after the first
gate, system A would be in the state |1〉 and system B would be in the state
|−〉. The control qubit would activate the controlled-Hadamard gate, and
system B would be transformed into the state |1〉, which is consistent with
its original state. The measurement on system A will yield a result of |1〉,
which indicates that the input was initially |ψ〉 = |−〉.
Brun and his collaborators were able to scale this protocol up to allow
for the discrimination between the four non-orthogonal BB84 states |0〉, |1〉,
|+〉 and |−〉. They achieve this by adding an ancillary chronology-respecting
quibit in the state |0〉, using two CTC-bound qubits, performing two SWAPs
and four controlled unitary transformations, and making two measurements.
Figure 2: BHW circuit for distinguishing the four BB84 states (from Brun et al. 2009).
The unitary transformations are as follows:
U00 ≡ SWAP
U01 ≡ X ⊗X
U10 ≡ (X ⊗ I) ◦ (H ⊗ I)
U11 ≡ (X ⊗H) ◦ (SWAP)






3.2 Using BHW to Signal
In Cavalcanti et al.’s (2012), the authors point out that the evolution of the
quantum state through the BHW circuit which allows for the possibility of
distinguishing the BB84 states is of the right kind to fit into a protocol for
instantaneous signaling proposed by Gisin (1990).
Gisin’s proposal involves two players, Alice and Bob, each sharing one half
of a singlet pair. Alice measures her particle either in the X direction (yield-
ing |1〉 or |0〉) or the Z direction (yielding |+〉 or |−〉), forcing Bob’s particle
into the same state. Bob then subjects his particle to a nonlinear evolution
of a certain type that allows him to determine its state. Gisin proposed a
particular nonlinear Hamiltonian that would do the job, but Cavalcanti and
Menicucci point out that the BHW circuit has the right features to fit into
this framework.
The BHW circuit will allow Bob to perfectly distinguish between all four
states. Therefore, if Alice wants to send a 1-bit message, she can choose either
to measure in the X direction (for “yes”) or the Z direction (for “no”). Bob,
using the BHW circuit, can recover Alice’s message, which is transmitted
instantaneously. That is, if the output of Bob’s device is |10〉 or |11〉, he
knows Alice measured her half of the singlet pair in the X direction (intending
the message to be “yes”), and if his results are either |00〉 or |01〉, he knows
she measured in the Z direction (meaning “no”).
3.3 The Bub-Stairs Consistency Condition
In a recent paper (2014) Jeffrey Bub and Allen Stairs propose a consistency
condition to solve one of the outstanding conceptual problems with Nonlocal
Signaling. Their condition solves some potential ambiguity associated with
the possibility of signaling.
The issue that the consistency condition is designed to solve arises be-
cause of the fact that the nature of Nonlocal Signaling allows for cause/effect
to happen at spacelike separation. Alice’s choice of measurement causes Bob
to get the result he does faster than a light signal would have been able to
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Figure 3: Cavalcanti and and collaborators’ proposal for using the BHW circuit in Gisin’s
instantaneous signaling device. Alice measures first measures her particle along the X or
Z axis. Bob then uses the BHW circuit to determine what state his particle is in.
traverse the distance. Since the event of Alice’s input and the event of Bob’s
output are at spacelike separation, observers in different frames will disagree
about which event comes before the other.That is, for some observers, Bob
will measure his particle before Alice measures hers. In those frames, Alice
and Bob’s shared Bell State will not have been disentangled by Alice’s mea-
surement, and therefore Bob will input a particle in the state I/2 into the
BHW circuit, which will yield any of the four possible outcomes with equal
probability, meaning that he has a 1/2 probability, in that frame, of getting
an output that corresponds to the wrong input for Alice. In frames where
Alice measures first, her choice determines Bob’s output by disentangling
their shared Bell State, leading to Bob measuring a particle in a definite
state with the BHW circuit. In frames where Bob measures first, he inputs
his still-entangled particle into the BHW circuit, yielding each of the four
possible outputs with equal probability, regardless of the input Alice later
chooses.
To protect against problem, they introduce a simple and elegant new
consistency condition. It consists of the conjunction of the following two
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claims:
(C1) Observers in differently moving reference frames agree on which events
occur, even if they disagree about the order of events.
(C2) If an event has zero probability in any frame of reference, it does not
occur.
C1 ensures the two observers would agree about the outcomes of the two
measurements (namely that the output Bob gets corresponds to the input
Alice makes, regardless of who goes first). C2 ensures that the contradic-
tion will never arise, since according to one observer, the probability of Bob
getting the outcome that is inconsistent with Alice’s input is 0.
While the consistency condition seems unobjectionable, I’ll argue in Sec-
tion 5.3 that the conclusions Bub and Stairs attempt to draw from it are
more problematic.
4 Arguments Against Nonlocal Signaling
4.1 The Linearity Trap
In a reply, Bennett et al. argue that the BHW circuit could not in fact
be used to distinguish between non-orthogonal states. This is because the
adversarial nature of such a task would preclude a player from having the
right kind of knowledge of the input state to be able to use the circuit. They
argue that, in the context of CTC-assisted computation, it is not generally
true that the evolution of a mixture is equal to the corresponding mixture
of the evolutions of individual states. They call failing to see this distinction
“the linearity trap”, and claim that Brun and his collaborators’ argument
falls into it. they argue that while the BHW circuit could (for example) map
the definite input state |−0〉 to the output |11〉, it fails when faced with a
mixed input state.
In general in quantum mechanics, a state density operator can be used to
represent two different kinds of “impure” states—a probability distribution
over a classical mixture, and a system which is entangled with some other
system not included in the representation.
That is to say, if the player Alice were trying to determine the state of
a system prepared for her by an adversary Rob, she would be unable to.
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This is because (the argument goes) the output of the BHW circuit when
acting on a mixed input state will itself be a mixture, and will not yield the
desired information. That is to say, Alice creates a density matrix encoding
her epistemic relationship to the input (she assigns probabilities to the four
possible inputs based on her knowledge of Rob’s proclivities, say). When the
circuit acts on this object, it will not yield a definite result telling Alice the
actual input. As Bennett et al. say:
Much of the apparent power of CTCs and nonlinear quantum me-
chanics comes from analyzing the evolution of pure states, and
extending the results linearly to find the evolution of mixed states.
However, because mixed states do not have a unique decomposi-
tion into pure states this does not give an unambiguous rule for
evolution. Indeed the very nature and meaning of mixed states
may be ill defined in such theories.” (Bennett et al. 2009, 4)
They go on to claim that a theory with the resources for identifying the
“correct” decomposition of mixed states into pure states would return the
power to CTCs, but at the cost of being a theory that fails to reduce to
standard quantum mechanics in regions distant from the CTC.
4.2 Cavalcanti and Menicucci Reply
In a response to this argument, Cavalcanti and Menicucci point out that
this clearly isn’t what Brun and collaborators had in mind. They argue that
Bennett et al. are confusing the density matrix which Alice may create to
encode her partial knowledge of the input with an actual physical mixed
input state. Rob has (by construction) prepared and presented to Alice a
pure state, and Alice therefore inputs a pure state into the device. If it were
true that the output depended on the density matrix Alice constructs to
encode her partial knowledge of the actual state, then the device would not
work deterministically even for Rob. Therefore the nonlinear action of the
device could not be verified, and we would not even be justified in claiming
to have knowledge of how it would act on a pure state. As they say:
In summary, empirical verifiability of the deterministic, nonlinear
action of some physical device for some set of pure-state inputs
generally precludes using density matrices to represent proper
mixtures of such inputs (Cavalcanti and Menicucci 2010).
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That is to say, in the context of CTC-assisted quantum computation, density
matrices cannot be used to assign probabilities over possible pure-state inputs
to a device. Alice will need to find another way to encode her epistemic
state. However, Bennett et al. have identified a potential problem for this
protocol. We have, by construction, been considering cases where Rob can
unproblematically produce pure quantum states. However, if he were unable
to do so, and entanglement persisted between the preparation apparatus and
the system being prepared, the system presented to Alice would genuinely
be in a mixed state, and the argument made by Bennett et al. would go
through. The implications of this fact are beyond the scope of the present
paper.
4.3 The Preparation Problem
Cavalcanti and his collaborators argue against the possibility of signaling
in this way. They claim that superluminal signaling is ruled out by special
relativity, and we should therefore conclude that something has gone wrong
in the argument that led us to predict this effect. They begin by defining
a notion of a nonlinear extension of quantum mechanics that reduces to
ordinary quantum mechanics everywhere outside of a particular spacetime
region. That is, they describe an ordinary quantum world, with one localized
extraordinary region, where the output states are a nonlinear function of the
input states. They refer to this region as the “nonlinear box”.
Figure 4: A localized region of nonlinear evolution, from (Cavalcanti et al. 2012).
According to Deutsch’s model, the effects of the existence of a CTC can
be localized to a particular region by a denotationally trivial transformation,
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so locating all of the effects of a CTC in a nonlinear box is allowed. In
this model, standard linear quantum mechanics is true everywhere outside
the box, and the only nonlinear evolutions happen to systems inside the (or
traveling through) the box.
In order to block the failure of the No Signaling principle, they argue
that different preparation procedures that unproblematically yield the same
pure state according to linear quantum mechanics, will in fact yield different
states, which will have different effects in the context of this nonlinear exten-
sion of quantum theory. Specifically, even though we consider the following
two preparation procedures to yield the same pure state in linear quantum
mechanics, the equivalence fails in the theory including the nonlinear box:
Procedure 1 Measure the an ensemble of qubits in the computational
basis, and post-select those that are in the state |1〉.
Procedure 2 Take an ensemble of pairs of maximally entangled qubits
in the Bell state |Φ+〉, and measure the states of the A quibits in the
computational basis, then post-select the B qubits that were entangled
with the A qubits for which the measurement result was |1〉.
As Cavalcanti and his collaborators say:
Signaling can be avoided only if the remote preparations in [Pro-
cedure 2] are not in the same equivalence class as the correspond-
ing preparations in [Procedure 1] when nonlinear transformations
are considered. (Cavalcanti et al. 2012, 3)
But this prescription leads to what they call the “preparation problem”,
which has two parts. Firstly, if it is the case that a pure quantum state
does not uniquely determine a system’s evolution through a nonlinear box
(because it may be the result of either preparation procedure), then the for-
malism of quantum states seems to be insufficient to account for the physical
situation. Secondly, the model is incomplete without a specification of which
preparation procedures fall into which equivalence classes in the nonlinear
box.
4.4 Reply to Cavalcanti et al.
Cavalcanti et al. argue that, since instantaneous signaling is impossible, some-
thing must have gone wrong with the analysis of the BHW circuit that led
to the prediction that Alice could send a signal to Bob.
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Under these assumptions, Alice may send information to Bob
instantaneously. Since consistency with relativity forbids this,
we must rethink our assumptions. (Cavalcanti et al. 2012, 4)
In this section I will argue that the constraint on superluminal travel from
special relativity is distinct from—and does not entail—a prohibition against
signaling via the exploitation of quantum nonlocality.
This question is given a more thorough treatment in (Dunlap 2014b).
But here it should be sufficient to note the following points. Firstly, Tim
Maudlin argues for a similar conclusion in his book Quantum Non-locality
and Relativity, saying
And we have further found that none of the restrictions can be
derived, in any strictly formal sense, from the Lorentz transforma-
tions, or from the fundamental relativistic space-time structure.
On the contrary, explicitly relativistic theories of tachyons and
of superluminal signals have been constructed. The fundamen-
tal feature of the Lorentz transformations is that they leave the
speed of light invariant, not that they render it an insuperable
boundary. (Maudlin 2011, 173)
Furthermore, Bub and Pitowsky’s influential paper on the information-
theoretic interpretation of quantum theory explicitly states that the two no-
tions are conceptually distinct, saying:
Note that ‘no signaling’ is not specifically a relativistic constraint
on superluminal signaling. It is simply a condition imposed on
the marginal probabilities of events for separated systems [...]
and this might well be considered partly constitutive of what one
means by separated systems. (?, 443)
Christopher Timpson’s analysis of the information-theoretic features of
nonlocal quantum effects makes the case that there is no carrier of informa-
tion being transmitted between the two distant locations. Timpson’s analysis
takes place in the context of a discussion of quantum teleportation, but the
argument applies equally well to the case of quantum signaling.
Timpson argues by way of conceptual (and linguistic) analysis that “infor-
mation” in the technical sense—as it appears in Information Theory, which
he denotes as “informationt so as to distinguish it from the non-technical
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notion—is an abstract noun, which does not refer to “a spatio-temporal par-
ticular, to a concrete entity, or to a physical substance” (Timpson 2013, 74).
He argues that we shouldn’t think of information as being an entity that is
somehow transported from one location to another.
Rather, “information transmission” needs to be understood as a physical
process in which a new token of informationt is created at B that is subse-
quent on the prior existence of another token of that same type having existed
at A. There is no thing traversing the space between A and B. Rather, there
is a physical process that results in another token of the informationt being
created. Since no physical entity of any kind need pass between A and B for
this to be the case, there is nothing that need travel faster than the speed of
light.
In the teleportation protocol, informationt (which, in this case, is the
unknown quantum state to be teleported) is tokened at location A, and sub-
sequently tokened at location B, having been caused by a physical process.
He believes that we are led astray when we take the phrase “the informationt”
to denote a particular.
The assumption [...] is that we need to provide a story of how
some located thing denoted by ‘the informationt’ travels from
Alice to Bob. Moreover, it is assumed that this supposed thing
should be shown to take a spatio-temporally continuous path.
(Timpson 2013, 82)
By recognizing “informationt” as an abstract noun, we solve this problem.
Furthermore, this recognition provides us with the only legitimate reading of
the question of how the informationt “got to Bob”. It is a question that is
answered by reference to the physical processes that produce at B another
token of the informationt that was tokened at A. In the case of quantum
information protocols, this answer will be quantum mechanical.
I am not claiming that there is no such thing as the transmission
of informationt, but simply that one should not understand the
transmission of informationt on the model of transporting pota-
toes, or butter, say, or piping water. [...] The transmission of a
piece of informationt from A to B will consist in the production
at B of another token of the type produced at A, where the pro-
duction at B is consequent on the token’s being produced at A.
(Timpson 2013, 83)
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Timpson then goes on to say that the unique feature of the teleportation
protocol is that the informationt can be tokened at B subsequent to its having
been tokened at A, but cannot be tokened at any point in between A and
B in the meantime. However, this feature is clearly shared by the signaling
protocol under consideration.
Timpson addresses the possibility the impossibility of signaling and the
relativistic constraint in this section.
The constraint is that superluminal signalling is ruled out on pain
of temporal loop paradoxes. What this means is that no phys-
ical process is permissible that would allow a signal to be sent
superluminally and thus allow information to be transmitted su-
perluminally. What are ruled out are certain types of physical
processes, not, save a metaphor, certain types of motion of infor-
mation. (Timpson 2013, 96)
Here I disagree with him. Certain types of motion of information are ruled
out. Namely, a single token of information can’t travel through the space
between two different locations faster than a light signal could.
He says that superluminal signaling is ruled out “on pain of temporal
paradoxes”. But this assumes that there is no possible solution to the tem-
poral paradoxes, and that the possibility of sending a message into the past
necessarily opens the door to paradox.
Here I’ll simply note that in the context of the present debate, this issue
has been solved by Deutsch’s consistency condition, the express purpose of
which which was to offer a solution to the threat of paradox generated by
the existence of a CTC. More will be said on this topic in Section 5.3.
But one thing is clear: Given that the Cavalcanti et al. paper is partici-
pating in this very debate, and given that relativity’s only claim against the
possibility of signaling is that it would allow for messages to the past, we can
take Timpson’s analysis of the transmission of information from A to B to
undermine Cavalcanti’s stated justification for ruling out the possibility of
signaling.
Finally, in (Dunlap 2014b) I argue that we need to distinguish between
superluminal transmission of information (FTLIT), in which a carrier of in-
formation traverses the space between the two distant regions faster than
a light signal could, and Nonlocal Signaling (NS), which relies on nonlocal
quantum effects, and in which no information carrying system traverses the
intermediate space.
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It is conceptually possible for one to exist without the other. After all,
we could discover that c is not the maximum speed for material particles,
without having to invoke quantum effects. And it was an open question
as to whether the quantum correlations precisified in Bell’s Theorem would
allow for the transmission of messages. The quantum formalism itself does
not require that there be carrier particles responsible for the nonlocal effects.
The existence of the ordinary non-signaling quantum correlations seems to
already be enough to be in conflict with relativity, if this were not the case.
If we assume that the correlations between the distant measurements must
be explained by the transmission of a causal influence through spacetime,
then the correlations allowed by ordinary quantum theory would already be
in conflict with relativity. It is often argued that this is not the case, because
the superluminal causal influence traveling between the two distant regions
does not result in any epistemically relevant experimental outcome. That is
to say, Bob cannot discover Alice’s input based on his output, even though a
superluminal causal influence has traveled to him from Alice’s experimental
setup, causing him to get the particular outcome he does. However, if this
is the reason that ordinary quantum correlations are not in conflict with
relativity, then information is playing an important role here. The prohibition
seems to be weakened to the point where it is no longer that nothing can
travel faster than light (in fact, causal influence can, so long as it has no
noticeable effect). What is prohibited from traveling faster than light is
interpretable information (see e.g. Norton 2013). Maudlin (2011) argues
against this point as well.
In the context of the current debate, however, this worry seems misplaced,
since the nonlinear evolution that originated this line of inquiry was that
caused by the presence of a CTC, which explicitly allows information to
travel into the past.2
4.5 Signaling and Relativity
I have argued in this section that two attempts to rule out the possibility of
signaling in the presence of a CTC fail. The “linearity trap” objection of Ben-
net et al. was handled by Cavalcanti and Menicucci’s analysis of verifiability.
However, Cavalcanti and his collaborators suggested their own justification
for ruling out signaling based on special relativity.
2This point will be explored in more detail in Section 5.3.
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I’ve argued that the relativistic constraint has no direct bearing on the
possibility of signaling, especially when we take Timpson’s analysis of informationt
transmission into account.
To summarize, if the concern with the BHW signaling protocol is that
something (a causal influence, say) is traveling faster than the speed of light,
then the teleportation protocol should already have given Cavalcanti et al.
pause. Both the signaling and the teleportation protocol share the feature
that the information appears at B instantaneously after being sent from A.3
I contend that the problem lies elsewhere. This can be illustrated by the
implausibility of the following scenario assuaging any of their concern: Alice
uses the BHW signaling setup to send a message to Bob, but Bob waits to
make his measurement (and therefore receive the message) until after a light
signal could have potentially traversed the space between them, even though
no such signal was sent.
This hypothetical scenario is actually similar to the teleportation proto-
col in one important respect: even though Bob’s system is instantaneously
affected by Alice’s choice of measurement, the information isn’t present at B
until after enough time has elapsed to ensure that no information was trans-
mitted faster than the speed of light. Of course, in our imagined scenario,
this feature is purely accidental, whereas in the teleportation protocol, this
feature is necessary.
The important differences between teleportation and signaling are two.
Firstly, what is sent to Bob in the teleportation protocol is an unknown
quantum state, and therefore not information he can use. Secondly, the token
of the information isn’t actually produced at Bob’s location until after two
classical bits of information are sent through a classical (subluminal) channel.
(One in four times, however, that information tells Bob that he already has
the correct state in hand. In those cases, even though the target state has
already been reproduced, he doesn’t have verification of this fact until the
classical bits arrive. This is a good example to draw out the fact that the
exploitability of the information is what is being prevented in teleportation.)
These two features prevent the teleportation protocol from being used to
send signals.
With respect to Cavalcanti et al.’s argument, I’ll simply say that the non-
linear evolution from which they were generalizing in their paper (and which
3And, as Maudlin showed, there are consistent relativistic models containing superlu-
minal causal influences.
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is the only one to have been explicitly shown to allow for signaling) is that
generated by the presence of a CTC, which explicitly allows for information
to be sent to the past, and which has a feature (namely, the consistency
condition) that protects against temporal paradoxes.
However, even in the absence of the relativistic justification for ruling
out the impossibility of instantaneous signaling, Cavalcanti et al. would
likely still want to rule it out on other grounds. If they can establish that
instantaneous signaling is in principle impossible, then their argument that
“we must rethink our assumptions” in our analysis of the BHW circuit would
go through.
In the following section, I’ll examine why this may be. I argue that the
impossibility of Nonlocal Signaling is a fundamental principle of quantum
information, and the project of an information-theoretic interpretation of
quantum theory relies on the exceptionless truth of such principles. The
reason for this is a deep difference in the conception of physical theories
between the proponents of the quantum information perspective, and those
who consider the ontology of a theory to be among its most fundamental
elements.
5 Quantum Information-Theoretic Motivations
5.1 Why Maintain No Signaling?
I’ve argued that the relativistic justification for the No-Signaling Principle
doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. I’ve presented evidence that nonlocal signaling
is not itself inconsistent with relativity. Why do people want to maintain it?
I will argue that the reason for the reticence to give up the No-Signaling
Principle has to do with its status in the field of quantum information. In
particular, it is one of the most promising principles in the reconstructions
of quantum theory literature. The principle of information causality, which
would fail if No Signaling failed, is the current contender for a principle that
can differentiate quantum correlations from superquantum correlations.
Information Causality says that the most classical information that can
yield from the transmission of one classical bit is one classical bit. Classical
information needs to follow an explicit continuous causal model. Signaling
can yield classical information at B without anything traversing between A
and B. So that would violate information causality.
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Information Causality is the latest in a list of potential physical principles
that is taken by proponents of the quantum information approach to be part
of the fundamental formulation of quantum theory.
This is a statement of the principle-based conception of physical theories.
This is a conception in which the fundamental formulation of a physical the-
ory is in terms of principled restrictions on the kinematical level. These prin-
ciples never need to be justified by ontological or dynamical considerations.
An empirically equivalent theory theory formulated in terms of dynamics and
ontology is taken on this approach to represent a less fundamental formula-
tion, which serves merely as a consistency proof for the set of principles that
constitute the definitive version of the theory.
The special theory of relativity is taken to be the paradigm example of
this kind of theory. Just as the Principle of Relativity and the Light Postulate
pick out Minkowski spacetime as the space of events in SR, and constrain the
structure of events in spacetime, the information-theoretic interpretation of
quantum theory take there to be principles that define a space of events for
quantum theory, and that space to constrain the structure of those events.
In the case of quantum mechanics, these principles are information-
theoretic and include a ‘no signaling’ principle and a ‘no cloning’
principle. The structure of Hilbert space imposes kinematic (i.e.
pre-dymanic) objective probabilistic constraints on events to which
a quantum dynamics of matter and fields is required to conform,
through its symmetries [...]. (Bub and Pitowsky 2010, 439)
And, as with relativity, they hold that there is no deeper explanation of the
structure of events than that they are subject to the constraints embodied
in the principles.
There is no deeper explanation for the quantum phenomena of
interference and entanglement than that provided by the struc-
ture of Hilbert space, just as there is no deeper explanation for
the relativistic phenomena of Lorentz contraction and time dila-
tion than that provided by the structure of Minkowski spacetime.
(Bub and Pitowsky 2010, 439)
In most cases these two ways of formulating a theory (principle and con-
structive) don’t come into any kind of conflict. But in the case of the nonlin-
ear extensions of quantum theory, the principle version of the theory makes
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different predictions than the constructive version. Following the dynam-
ics of the systems under consideration leads us to conclude that signaling
is effected in the BHW circuit. But this is in explicit conflict with the No-
Signaling Principle.
5.2 Deutsch’s Metaphysics
Deutsch would reject the claim that a principle version of quantum theory is
more fundamental than a constructive version. There is an extended argu-
ment to this effect in (Dunlap 2014a). Here I will simply note two points.
Firstly, Deutsch is an Everettian. By virtue of this, he has serious meta-
physical commitments about the way the world is fundamentally structured.
He that the right way to understand quantum theory is primarily as a theory
with a definite ontology—the wavefunction—and dynamical laws. This is in
explicit contradistinction to the principle-theoretic conception of quantum
theory.
Furthermore, as I argue in (Dunlap 2014a), the D-CTC model relies for its
formulation on a strong ontic realism about the many worlds of the Everett
Interpretation. The definite existencet of counterpart systems in parallel
worlds is necessary for solving the quantum CTC paradoxes that motivate
his work. As he says, interpretations that insist on a single outcome of an
experiment do not have the resources to solve the paradoxes. The Everett
Interpretation’s extra structure (i.e. the uncollapsed branches of the wave-
function) is what allows it to solve the paradoxes.
In the Everett Interpretation, it is only the state, which describes,
roughly speaking, a collection of values taken as a whole, which
must be unchanged after passage round a closed timelike line.
(Deutsch 1991, 3206)
For example, his analysis of a grandfather-like paradox runs as follows:
In all universes the observer approaches the chronology-violating
region on a trajectory which would go back in time. But only in
half of them does the observer remain on that trajectory, because
in half the universes there is an encounter with an older version
of the observer after which the younger version changes course
and does not go back in time. After that, both versions live on
into the unambiguous future. (Deutsch 1991, 3206–3207)
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There is an interesting question about whether the details of his con-
sistency condition are actually consistent with the standard Everett Inter-
pretation. His condition requires that ρ, a mixed state, be consistent when
traveling around the CTC. He interprets ρ as a collection of worlds, with
counterpart systems present in all of them. However, these worlds do not
arise in the normal Everettian way (as branches of a wavefunction). This
question is addressed in detail in (Dunlap 2014a).
Since Deutsch’s metaphysics plays such a central role in the formulation of
his CTC model, it cannot be ignored. It is therefore problematic for quantum
information theorists to adopt this model for analysis in a principle-theoretic
context. Despite their claim to be neutral to questions of interpretation, the
metaphysics is playing a fundamental role in the example.
As a consequence, the principle-theoretic prohibition against Nonlocal
Signaling cannot be taken seriously in this debate. The D-CTC itself cannot
be formulated in the principle-theory context. So the imposition of the No-
Signaling Principle is inappropriate.
5.3 Bub-Stairs Consistency
Another conflict with Deutsch’s approach that is present in this debate is
present in the Bub and Stairs paper, and is related to the point about nolo-
cality and relativity from above. Bub and Stairs argue that their consistency
condition allows for a “radio to the past”, or a protocol for sending classical
information back in time. They contend that the existence of this proto-
col opens the door to temporal paradox. As mentioned in 4.4, I believe
that Deutsch’s consistency condition wold apply to this classical information
channel as well.
The evidence for this claim is comes from the fact that Deutsch, as an
Everettian, would deny that there was any principled distinction between
classical information and quantum information. Ultimately, classical infor-
mation supervenes on quantum systems. In order to be consistent with his
broader view on the interpretation of quantum theory, he must treat the
classical domain and the quantum domain as subject to the same laws, par-
ticularly one as fundamental as a consistency condition.
In fact, in his paper, he explicitly states that he conceiving of computation
for the purposes of this argument as
a representative physical process—representing the behavior of
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general physical systems under the unfamiliar circumstances of
chronology violation. (Deutsch 1991, 3197)
He develops a standard form for a CTC-assisted quantum circuit for the pur-
poses of defining his consistency condition in a simple way. But he says that
any spacetime bounded network, which he uses to represent general phys-
ical systems, can be trivially transformed into a denotationally equivalent
standard form, which localize any closed loop of information onto a CTC.
...[T]he transformed version would be intuitively very different
from the original one which might represent a time traveler, whereas
the transformed version appears to represent an ordinary space
traveler meeting a time traveler who spontaneously comes into
existence as an identical twin of the space traveler, exists for a fi-
nite period of time on an “eternal” loop, and then ceases to exist.
(Deutsch 1991, 3199)
It is clear that Deutsch takes these quantum-circuit representations to be
completely general. Therefore, his consistency condition should apply to all
physical systems.
Bub and Stairs consider the radio to the past protocol to be potentially
paradoxical because they insist on a strict distinction between the classical
domain and the quantum domain.
They say that they see their consistency condition as allowing for a ‘ra-
dio to the past’, which opens the door for the reemergence of the time travel
paradoxes in the classical domain. This comes from the fact that they are
implicitly taking on a Heisenberg (or operationalist) picture, which is char-
acteristic of quantum information, but is rejected by the realist approaches
to the interpretation of quantum theory. This is the same problem we saw
above: the tenets of the quantum information-theoretic interpretation of
quantum theory are doing work behind the scenes to justify the approach to
the problem.
And finally, it should be noted that even in a purely classical context,
there are analogues of Deutsch’s consistency condition that are taken equally
scientifically seriously (e.g. Lewis 1976 and Novikov 2002). So even if they
argue that Deutsch’s consistency condition only applies to quantum infor-
mation, there are consistency conditions in reserve ready to step in.
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6 Conclusion
The considerable recent interest among the quantum information community
in the D-CTC model has produced genuinely interesting results. The BHW
circuit and its use in the Nonlocal Signaling protocol are considerable contri-
butions to our understanding of how quantum systems behave in nonlinear
extensions of quantum theory.
However, we must be sensitive to the fact that there are significant con-
straints on the generality of the D-CTC model. Its formulation presupposes
significant metaphysical commitments, and is therefore applicable only in
contexts where those metaphysical commitments are shared. Failing to rec-
ognize this feature of the model threatens to undermine its application. I
argue that this problem is present in the debate in the quantum information
literature, in particular in the attempts to impose the No-Signaling Principle
on the framework in which the system is being analyzed.
Because of these underlying commitments, the D-CTC model serves as
an important example for the divergence between the principle-theoretic ap-
proaches to quantum theory, and the more metaphysically robust construc-
tive approaches. Deutsch himself is unambiguously an advocate of the latter,
and the model is arguably incoherent on the former approach.
While this discrepancy does not necessarily have any bearing on the ques-
tion of which is the better approach to the foundations of quantum theory,
it does help bring into contrast their differences. My own view, as advocated
in (Dunlap 2014c), is that foundational progress in a physical theory will
only come with a fully realized account of the fundamental ontology of the
physical world.
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